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ABSTRACT This article measures populist discourse among prime ministers in 
new Central and Eastern European democracies using holistic grading as a specific 
type of textual analysis. The article first offers a definition of populism and then 
measures political discourse by grading political speeches of contemporary prime 
ministers in Central and Eastern Europe. Next, it presents descriptive data about 
prime ministers’ political discourse and discusses positive cases of populism in 
reference to democratic structures. Despite suggestions that we live in a populist 
zeitgeist, populism is a rare and occasional phenomenon in Central and Eastern 
European executive politics. It has often been associated with violations of 
democratic structure by individual leaders. However, these violations are more 
likely to be related to undemocratic political culture in general than to populism in 
particular. Where populism does coincide with an already undemocratic political 
mindset, this represents a more serious threat to democratic standards. 
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INTRODUCTION
Despite several decades of research on populism, the concept remains 
something that everyone talks about, but no one really understands. For 
example, it is little understood why journalists or academics label some 
politicians populists. Principally, this is related to conceptual confusion 
about the meaning of populism, which consequently hinders its investigation 
and measurement. Nevertheless, in recent decades scholars have invested 
extensive effort into reaching an agreement about how populism can be 
defined, while at the same time they have tested different techniques for 
measuring individual or elite level populism. 
Many scholars have warned about a rising tide of populism in CEE; 
however, we lack systematic comparative studies to support this argument. A 
number of electorally-successful populist parties are participating in executive 
politics across Europe (i.e. the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish People’s 
Party, the Italian Northern League, the Swedish Democrats, Hungarian Jobbik 
and Bulgarian Ataka). However, these populist forces are entering executive 
politics by capturing only a smaller share of votes, which makes them coalition 
partners, not coalition leaders. In CEE, however, several such political forces 
have entered mainstream politics by capturing the highest share of votes 
(i.e. Hungarian Fidesz, Bulgarian GERB, the Slovenian Democrats and the 
Polish Law and Justice Party). This does not mean that populist parties are 
fully absent from mainstream executive politics in Western Europe2, but 
rather that, in CEE, populist forces are more frequently participating in top 
executive politics. 
This study is designed to examine the so-far neglected phenomenon of 
populism among party leaders who usually occupy prime ministerial posts 
once their parties win elections. Prime ministers, as the highest-ranking 
executive officers, have wide decision-making powers, which make elite level 
populism important in politics. This article’s primary purpose is to provide 
descriptive data about the level of populism of a number of prime ministers. 
In doing so, it contributes to a larger debate in academia and the media about 
who rightly deserves to be labelled a populist, and why. It certainly makes 
sense to measure the level of populism of certain party leader/prime minister 
first, and only then analyze how and why it matters to politics.
The article starts by defining populism as a discourse. As a discourse, 
2  For example, the Swiss People’s Party has been the strongest party in the past few elections and 
Greek Syriza became the largest party after the 2015 elections.
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populism shares a Manichean3 vision of the world in which ‘the people’ are 
seen as inherently “good” and virtuous, while elites are inherently “bad’ 
and corrupt. These two political subjects - the people and the elite - are in 
a constant cosmic struggle for power. Populists favor the overthrow of the 
unjust and corrupt elite through systemic changes that follow their rise to 
power (i.e. constitutional changes). The article then introduces holistic 
grading as a specific type of textual analysis that quantifies the populism 
of specific prime ministers using a three-point interval scale. The technique 
was developed by an American political scientist, Kirk A. Hawkins (2009) 
and has previously been used to measure the populist discourse of Latin 
American presidents. The method has proved successful in cross-regional 
comparisons of populist discourse by political leaders or parties through the 
holistic grading of political texts. In addition, compared to other manually 
coded methods of textual analysis, holistic grading is reasonably efficient for 
use on small and large samples and produces reliable data. Before concluding, 
the article presents data about the populist discourse of 27 contemporary 
prime ministers in eleven CEE countries during 30 prime ministerial terms 
and discusses positive cases in reference to the common understanding of 
populism, and briefly, in relation to the consequences this has on politics. 
In contrast to the general impression that we live in a populist zeitgeist, 
data from this study indicate that CEE populism is a rather occasional and 
rare phenomenon. The holistic grading of political speeches identified 
strong populism in only one case, while only five contemporary CEE Prime 
ministers out of 27 turned out to be moderately populist. Previous studies 
have speculated about the causes of populism and its influences on democratic 
structure (Carpenter 1997; Gallina 2010; Bugaric 2008; Mesežnikov et al. 
2008; Rupnik 2007). Data in this study suggest that the undemocratic lapses 
of CEE prime ministers might have more to do with a generally undemocratic 
political culture than populism alone. Nevertheless, where populism coincides 
with already undemocratic mindsets, the consequences for politics are more 
dangerous. 
POPULISM AS DISCOURSE
The increasing amount of comparative research on populism has contributed 
to an emerging consensus that populism is best described as a set of ideas that 
3  A Manichean worldview infers making a strong moral judgment about each single issue 
categorizing it into one of two clearly dualistic categories (i.e. good/bad, right/wrong). 
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relates to seeing the world through Manichean glasses, juxtaposing the “will 
of the people” in a cosmic struggle with the conspiring elite (Hawkins 2009). 
In its ideational format, populism is not an exclusive discourse, but one of a 
number of other possible discourses, including pluralism and elitism. Table 1 
distinguishes between populism and other political discourse.
Table 1. Types of political discourse
Discourse
Manichean 
vision
People vs. Elites
Populist Present ‘The people’ are more virtuous than the elite
Pluralist Absent Commends diversity of ideas in society
Elitist Present The elites are intellectually superior to ‘the people’
The populist discourse embraces the Manichean vision in which virtuous 
people are in constant struggle against corrupt elites. This standpoint 
encourages the use of non-democratic means and the demonization of 
political opponents. Pluralist discourse is the theoretical polar opposite of 
populism, rejects the Manichean vision of the world as a struggle between 
the people and the elites, and embraces more universalistic themes. Unlike 
populism, pluralism favors the diversity of ideas and interests in society and 
encourages the acceptance of political opponents as political equals rather 
than political enemies. The elitist discourse shares populism’s Manichean 
distinction between the people and the elite. However, elitism praises the elite 
as a selected group of individuals that is intellectually superior to the people 
as a result of which the elite, not the people, deserve to be in charge of the 
government (Mudde 2004; Hawkins 2009). 
Conceptualizing populism as discourse4 not only allows us to develop 
suitable techniques for measuring populism, but to also ask theoretically 
relevant questions about why and how populism matters for politics and 
whether different discourses have concrete consequences on elections, 
policy outputs and the functioning of democracy. This approach to populism 
as discourse has already advanced research on populism in cross-regional 
studies through textual analysis, survey research and experiments (Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Hawkins et al. 2012; 
Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; Vasilopoulou et al. 2014; Akkerman et al. 
2014; De Waele and Cholova 2011; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; 
4  For a critique of populism as discourse and a discussion of other possible definitions of 
populism, see Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013)
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Balcere 2014; Hawkins 2009). In addition, it has encouraged research into 
the causes of populism and its consequences by means of cross-regional 
comparative studies (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Seligson 2007; Doyle 
2011; Navia and Walker 2010; Hawkins 2012; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; 
Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Kriesi 2014; Mesežnikov et al. 2008; Tupy 2006; 
Gallina 2008). Nevertheless, systematic studies of populism are rare and those 
that apply to CEE have mostly focused on single cases or a limited number of 
cases (Jasiewicz 2008; Bozóki 2012; Bugaric 2008). In this respect, this study 
is an original attempt to measure the populist discourse of a larger number of 
individual CEE prime ministers. 
What are the essential elements of populism as discourse? As a set of ideas, 
populism juxtaposes the notion of the people with an elite group, whom it 
sees as conspiring against the popular will for selfish purposes  (Hawkins 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 4). A necessary condition for populism to exist, 
according to this definition, is a Manichean worldview by which virtuous 
people “crusade” against corrupt elites. This vision assigns a strong moral 
dimension to every issue and enables their categorization as “right”/”good” or 
“evil”/bad”. A discourse may still be considered democratic because popular 
will is the primary source of power. However, populists understand popular 
will to be a unified whole, rather than allowing it to be whatever the majority 
of people decide at any particular moment.  
The moral significance of issues is amplified by assigning cosmic 
proportions to threats evoked by a conspiring elite and a reified notion of 
history characterized by reverence for national/religious leaders. The nature 
of the conspiring/corrupt elite can differ according to context (including the 
opposition party, business elite, a foreign country or international institution - 
i.e. the US, the EU or Russia), but may also arise in the form of an ideology (i.e. 
capitalism, colonialism, neoliberalism, communism or environmentalism). 
Populists usually favor systemic change and the overthrow of “corrupt” 
elite as a solution to the elite conspiracy against the people, even if change 
really comes only through elections. Finally, populists frequently justify non-
democratic means and use openly bellicose language towards their opponents. 
In the pluralist discourse, issues are not framed in moral and dualistic 
terms, but focus on narrow and particular/pragmatic issues (i.e. the economy, 
budgets, taxation, education or infrastructure). The discourse favors natural 
differences of opinion and does not refer to any reified notion of history. 
Rather, temporal issues are limited to material reality and demystified 
connections are found to be more common. A pluralist speaker understands 
democracy to be a simple matter of vote-counting, rather than the emergence 
of a fixed, preexisting will. This discourse avoids the use of a conspiratorial 
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tone and does not identify a single evil minority that is in charge. Even if it 
identifies an opponent, passions are muted and the tone is positive. Finally, a 
pluralist discourse does not favor systemic change but encourages the politics 
of difference over hegemony and emphasizes great respect for formal rights, 
the rule of law and democratic institutions.   
MEASURING POPULIST DISCOURSE
The ability to measure the level of populist discourse among real political 
individuals across time and space not only adds scientific value to the definition 
of populism but also allows us to improve our knowledge about populism’s 
causes and consequences. Only a handful of studies have measured populism 
in a systematic way, while most research into populism has focused on one 
case, or comparisons between parties or leaders in few countries, which does 
not allow for wider generalizations. When the above definition of populism 
as discourse is applied to the systematic analysis of political individuals 
through textual analysis, the end result is a dataset about discourse expressed 
in numerical scores for a large number of prime ministers across CEE (see 
Table 2). 
The technique of the holistic grading of political speeches was developed 
and adapted by the American political scientist, Kirk A. Hawkins (2009) and 
was originally used to measure the political discourse of Latin American 
presidents. The holistic grading of political texts uses manual coders who 
are able to quickly analyze complex patterns of meaning and interpret whole 
texts, rather than smaller units of content such as words or sentences, which 
would be typical of standard computer or human-based content analysis. 
For the research described in this paper, the grading technique proceeded in 
three steps. First, we recruited individuals to read and interpret the political 
speeches of prime ministers in their native languages. We did not define any 
specific requirements for recruiting coders, except for their ability to speak 
the original language of the political speeches selected in our sample. We 
recruited about 50 native speakers of languages across Central and Eastern 
Europe who were pursuing an MA in political science at Central European 
University in Budapest in the spring of 2013. We then familiarized the coders 
with the preferred definition of populism and pluralism and equipped them 
with skills relevant to fill the rubric. The rubric (available upon request) 
served as a short coding guideline for readers to assist them in the holistic 
grading of the speeches and to ensure better data quality. 
Grading alone can proceed quickly once coders are properly trained and 
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once political speeches are available. The unit of analysis was a prime 
ministerial term, using four speeches selected non-randomly.5 After reading 
the text in its entirety (holistic grading), coders assigned a numerical score 
that best represented the discourse prevalent in each individual text. We used 
a three-point numerical scale, where zero represented a non-populist, namely 
a pluralist text, one represented a text that mixes elements of populist and 
pluralist discourse and two represented a speech where populist ideas were 
strongly expressed. During training workshops, we presented coders with 
several political speeches that had previously been graded so coders would 
become familiar with using the grades as guidelines when making decisions 
about individual texts.6 
Two coders7 graded each individual speech after reading it in its original 
language. The final score for each prime minister presented in Table 2 
represents the average score of both coders’ scores across all four speeches.8 
In addition, coders translated short citations from the original text to English 
and copied them in the relevant rubric’s slots to denote populist or pluralist 
discourse. At the end of each rubric, coders provided short explanations 
about how elements of one or both discourses fared in individual texts. These 
short speech citations and summaries are the main source of qualitative 
data discussed below. The primary purpose of their inclusion is to support 
the numerical grades assigned to individual texts. Our data turned out to be 
highly reliable. After calculating the interclass coefficient that demonstrates 
how consistent different coders are relative to one another at measuring the 
same concept (on average), we learn that coders agree with each other about 
5  We asked coders to find one speech for each of our four speech categories; a campaign speech 
(given during an electoral campaign), a ribbon-cutting speech (given at an opening ceremony 
with a small local audience), an international speech (given to an international audience, 
typically at the UN), and a famous speech (the most important or well-known speech that 
defined the career of individual leader). 
6  We used a speech by Evo Morales (Bolivia) as an ideal type – score two – populist text, a 
speech by Steven Harper (Canada) as a speech that mixed elements of populism and pluralism 
– a score one example, and a speech by Tony Blair as an ideal type – score zero - pluralist 
speech.
7  To ensure inter-coding reliability coders did not see each other’s scores before final meetings 
at which we discussed the scores together, hoping they would agree as much as possible on the 
scores assigned to individual texts.  
8  Because not all categories of speeches were available for all prime ministers, the average score 
indicated in Table 2 reflects coding based on three speeches for Mečiar (Slovakia), Brazauskas 
(Lithuania) and Zeman (Czech Republic).
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90 percent of the time9; a relatively high degree of agreement between the two 
coders of each individual speech.  
ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE DATA
The cumulative result of our large-scale data collection effort is a data set 
about the political discourse of 27 contemporary prime ministers during 30 
prime ministerial terms in eleven CEE democracies, as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Prime ministers’ political discourse
Country Prime minister Coding applies to Score
Mean s.d.
Slovakia Vladimír Mečiar ** 1994 - 1998 1.7 0.3
Czech R Mirek Topolánek 2004 - 2009 1.0 0.5
Hungary Viktor Orbán 2010 - April 2013 0.9 1.0
Slovakia Robert Fico 2006 - 2010 0.8 1.0
Slovenia Janez Janša 2004 - 2008 0.8 0.6
Bulgaria Boyko Borisov                      2009 – March 2013 0.6 0.5
Latvia Einars Repše* 2002 - 2004 0.5**** 0.6
Latvia Aigars Kalvītis* 2004 - 2007 0.5 0.6
Croatia Ivo Sanader 2003 - 2009 0.4 0.5
Hungary Viktor Orbán 1998 - 2002 0.4 0.5
Romania
Calin Popescu - 
Tariceanu
2004 - 2008 0.4 0.8
Romania Viktor Ponta 2012 - April 2013 0.4 0.5
Slovakia Mikuláš Dzurinda 2002 - 2006 0.4 0.8
Poland Jarosław Kaczyński* 2006 - 2007 0.3 0.5
Romania Emil Boc 2008 - 2012 0.3 0.5
Slovakia Mikuláš Dzurinda 1998 - 2002 0.3 0.5
Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas** 2001 - 2006 0.2 0.3
Bulgaria Sergei Stanishev 2005 - 2009 0.1 0.3
Bulgaria Simeon Sakskoburggotsk 2001 - 2005 0.1 0.3
Czech R Petr Nečas 2010 - April 2013 0.1 0.3
Estonia Andrus Ansip 2007 - 2011 0.1 0.3
Croatia Ivica Račan 2000 - 2003 0 0
Czech R Miloš Zeman** 1998 – 2002 0 0
Estonia Andrus Ansip 2005 – 2007 0 0
9  The interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was 0.87 with 95% confidence interval (0.81 – 
0.91), [F (99, 99) = 7.9, p < 0.000)]. The ICC is calculated for the full grading sample minus 
Latvia and Poland where only one coder participated in holistic grading. 
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Estonia Andrus Ansip 2011 - April 2013 0 0
Hungary Ferenc Gyurcsány 2004 - 2009 0 0
Latvia Valdis Dombrovskis* 2009 - April 2013 0 0
Lithuania Andrius Kubilius 2008 - 2012 0 0
Poland Donald Tusk* 2011 - April 2013 0 0
Slovenia Borut Pahor 2008 - 2012 0 0
Campaign speech***   0.7 0.7
Famous speech 0.4 0.7
Ribbon-cutting speech 0.2 0.4
International speech   0.1 0.3
Source: (Hawkins and Kocijan 2013. Dataset on political discourse among chief executives in CEE and Central 
Asia)
* Only one coder contributed 
** Only three speeches available
*** Average score across all Prime Ministers in individual speech category 
**** Scores of 0.5 and lower indicate isolated or weak elements of populism across prime ministers’ speeches 
and a lack of explicit references to popular will or corrupt elite that is conspiring against the people. According 
to the definition of populism provided above, such references are preconditions for the awarding of a “populist” 
score (0.6 and higher).
Despite concerns raised by academics and journalists about the rising tide of 
populism, data from this study indicate that populism among chief executives 
in Central and Eastern Europe is an occasional and rare phenomenon. 
A varying degree of populism was confirmed by our analysis to exist among 
populism’s usual suspects,10 including Mečiar in Slovakia, Topolánek in the Czech 
Republic, Orbán in Hungary, Fico in Slovakia, Janša in Slovenia and Borisov 
in Bulgaria. Accordingly, our data speak well to the common understandings 
of populism. The main contribution of this study, however, is its comparative 
analysis of a large number of cases with a varying degree of populism, which 
improves our knowledge as to how populist a leader is. This opens the window 
to new research about why and how populism matters for politics. 
Findings from the Central Eastern European data resonate with findings 
about the populism of contemporary Latin American presidents. The incidence 
of populism in both data sets is almost identical, as is the intensity of populist 
discourse. In Latin America,11 only Hugo Chavez (1.8) in Venezuela and Evo 
10  Our project also included two former presidents who were identified by preexisting literature as 
likely populists. Vaclav Klaus, in both his presidential terms (2003 – 2013), turned moderately 
populist with a score of 0.6 in his first and a score of 1 in his second term. We also confirmed 
the existence of moderate populism for the Polish Lech Kaczyński whose score was 0.8. 
11  The holistic technique confirmed the populist discourse of several historical Latin American 
presidents, including Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador (1.7), Juan Peron in Argentina (1.5), Vargas 
in Brazil (1.0 in first and 0.9 in second term), Menem in Argentina (0.8), Saca in El Salvador 
(0.6) and Cardenas in Mexico (0.6) (Hawkins 2009).
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Morales (1.6) in Bolivia come close to ideal type populism. In CEE, only 
Vladimír Mečiar (1.7) in Slovakia is a “hard” populist, while all other prime 
ministers (with scores of 0.6 or higher) may be considered “soft “or only 
moderately populist, including Topolánek (1.0), Orbán in his second term 
(0.9), Fico (0.8), Janša (0.8) and Borisov (0.6). Similarly, except for Chavez 
and Morales in Latin America, only a few presidents are moderately populist, 
including Rafael Correa in Ecuador (1.3), Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (1.3), 
Alan Garcia in Peru (0.8), and Mauricio Funes (0.6) in El Salvador. In both 
Latin American and CEE datasets, most prime ministers and presidents (see 
Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013 for the Latin American dataset) turned 
out to be either weakly populist or pluralist. The holistic grading of political 
speeches by leaders in other regions was less systematic; hence, comparative 
conclusions about populism on a cross-regional basis are at present only 
preliminary. Some data about Western European leaders is available for 
Spain, Finland and Norway where prime ministers are predominately pluralist 
(Hawkins 2009). Holistic grading confirmed the existence of moderate 
populist discourse for only one Western European prime minister included 
in our sample, the Italian Silvio Berlusconi12 (Hawkins and Kocijan 2013). 
Our data further suggest the importance of context-related factors that 
influence the emergence of populist discourse. Prime ministers are more 
likely to resort to populist discourse during electoral campaigns (i.e. prior 
to assuming executive posts) which is often the period when they are not 
part of the elite establishment but when they are competing to participate in 
government. Nevertheless, even during electoral campaigns, prime ministers’ 
populist discourse appears only moderate, with an average score of 0.7 for all 
campaign speeches across all prime ministers. Once in office, however, prime 
ministers significantly tone down their populism, as indicated by the lower 
average scores for famous (0.4), ribbon-cutting (0.2) and international (0.1) 
speech categories.13 This can be explained by their newly-established elite 
status that makes anti-elite discourse less popular and supports the preexisting 
argument that populism is most prevalent among political outsiders, although 
further research in this area is certainly welcome.
12  Berlusconi’s discourse during his first prime ministerial term (2001 – 2006) was expressed 
using a score of 0.8 and a score of 0.9 in his second prime ministerial term (2008 – 2011).
13  We get almost identical average scores in individual speech categories across all prime 
ministers compared to the Latin American dataset (see Hawkins 2009, 1053).
81WHO IS POPULIST IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2015) 
ANALYSIS OF POPULIST PRIME MINISTERS
The literature notes that populists and their governments are prone to 
authoritarian experiments and frequent violations of democratic norms. 
These violations are most often, but not exclusively related to openly 
challenging constitutional courts, curtailing the independence of the media, 
limiting the professionalism of the civil service and limiting constitutionally-
granted minority rights (Bugaric 2008; Gallina 2010; Navia and Walker 
2010; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). 
The following section discusses the qualitative data appraised by holistic 
grading that supports the numerical scores presented in Table 2 and analyzes 
how well these data relate to the authoritarian tendencies of populist prime 
ministers.  
Strong populists
That Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia is the only “strong” populist in CEE is 
hardly surprising. Mečiar’s populism, authoritarian governing style, disrespect 
for democracy, misuse of the media and involvement in privatization scandals 
are well documented (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová 2008; Bunce and Wolchik 
2011; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Haughton 2002; Fish 1999; 
Gallina 2010). Elements of populist discourse are consistent across Mečiar’s 
speeches and fit the category of nationalist populism. He juxtaposes the Slovak 
nation against any elite that challenges Slovakia’s struggle for nationhood. 
In his campaign 1994 speech, he claims, [“our Slovakia will be healthier, 
stronger and happier” (…) “despite the anti-national propaganda claiming the 
opposite”]. In his famous 1998 speech, he portrays his HZDS as the “movement 
of the people, always in the service of citizens that never misused power”. 
Identification of the conspiring elite varies across Mečiar’s speeches. He was 
less specific about identifying conspiring elite in his campaign 1994 speech 
in which he hints at political opponents as “those who want to get personal 
benefits”. However, he took a more aggressive stand towards the opposition 
in his famous 1998 speech where he labeled Dzurinda a “pseudo-economist 
with inclinations to polarize society and provoke scandals, favoring politics of 
revenge, prisons and terror”, features common to the opposition elite, that is, 
according to Mečiar, composed of “gossipers, liars and haters”. The demand 
for systemic change, including the centralization of authority and granting 
fewer powers to the president, was evident in his discourse. However, some 
pluralist ideas were also present in some of Mečiar’s speeches. In a famous 
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speech, given prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, he emphasized his 
party “was in favor of a culture of tolerance, cooperation and not a society 
divided by ethnic lines” and expressed his willingness to “cooperate with 
everybody”. 
Moderate populists
Compared to Mečiar, Fico’s populist discourse is less consistent. During 
his first prime ministerial term (2006 – 2010), he was often criticized 
for legislation that limited the investigative power of the media and for 
marginalizing Hungarian minority parties (Gallina 2010). The Manichean 
worldview is identifiable in his two moderately populist speeches. In his 
famous 2010 speech, he portrays Smer as “a defender of the Slovaks from 
potentially dangerous right-wing government” that will “implement policies 
against the interests of ordinary people and social stability”. Similarly, in 
his ribbon-cutting 2003 speech, he portrays Smer as “protector of people’s 
interests against energy monopolies”. Fico also consistently demonizes 
political opponents across his speeches, except in his UN speech where his 
discourse is entirely pluralist. He accuses the opposition of engaging in illegal 
campaigning against Smer and in his campaign 2010 speech emphasizes, [“in 
a democratic country, it is not possible to respect someone who abuses the 
signature of the Prime Minister and the president of the strongest political 
party (…) and “who engages in vote buying”].14    
Topolánek’s discourse in the Czech Republic is moderately populist across 
his speeches. His worldview is Manichean and his ODS party is framed in 
his campaign 2005 speech as “the savior of the people who should not be 
afraid anymore of various corrupt elites, including the socialist opposition 
and communists” that he compares to “cancer, black passengers and leeches 
who suck the life of the state”. In his international speech (given in Estonia 
in 2008), he is a harsh critique of EU bureaucracy and Brussels policies that 
favor the old against the interests of new member states. However, despite 
his anti-EU discourse, he is not entirely against the EU but only critical of 
specific policies. The speeches of a decade-long Czech president, Vaclav 
Klaus, were also subject to holistic grading and confirmed his discourse as 
14  Allegedly, one private company linked to the opposition party SaS put stickers on people’s 
cars and motor vehicles instructing them “not to vote for the democratic left” (Fico’s Smer) 
and offering them a ten percent discount on copy and fax services if they bring in unused 
voting ballots.
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only moderately populist. He is more specific in identifying the conspiring 
elite (i.e. the EU, global warming activists and environmentalists) than in 
referencing the people. He comes closest to populism when he emphasizes 
the EU’s democratic deficits and the EU policies that limit people’s freedoms 
and free trade. This finding resonates well with previous studies that have 
accused the Czech elite of euroscepticism (Gallina 2008). Anti-EU arguments 
prevailed over “us versus them” projections in the discourse by both Czech 
politicians who were also frequently accused by the media of dubious 
exclusionary rhetoric and alleged involvement in large-scale corruption 
scandals. 
Hungarian Viktor Orbán adopted intense populist discourse in two out of his 
four speeches. He views the world through Manichean glasses, juxtaposing 
Hungarians against the socialist opposition elite and foreign powers (including 
foreign business interests, but also the EU). In famous 2012 speech Orbán 
states [“We will not be a colony” (…) “Hungarians won’t live according to the 
commands of foreign powers; they won’t give up their independence or their 
freedom” (…) “Colonizers of today are patiently stalking their targets” (…) 
“We know well the nature of undesirable comradely help, and we recognize 
it even if it does not come in military uniforms but in well tailored suits”]. 
Orbán also favored the overthrow of the existing socialist elite and compared 
the 2010 elections to the revolution, connecting it to the historical struggles of 
the Hungarians for freedom in 1848, 1956 and 1989. His discourse, however, 
did not encourage systemic change to fix elite injustices. Nevertheless, 
Orbán’s authoritarian experiments with undermining checks and balances, 
changing the Hungarian Constitution and other undemocratic practices have 
been documented and have prompted some scholars to describe contemporary 
Hungary as a “simulated democracy” where democratic institutions exist, 
but where the elite engage in polarizing and increasingly norm-breaching 
confrontational behavior (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2012). 
Janša’s populism in Slovenia and his ambiguous democratic practices are 
well-documented and include attacks on constitutional court decisions, media 
freedom and involvement in corruption scandals (Rizman 2006; Bugaric 
2008). A Manichean vision is evident throughout his speeches. Slovenians 
are assigned essentially virtuous qualities and are juxtaposed against corrupt 
elites that are either old communist nomenclature or Janša’s socialist-liberal 
opposition. He mixes elements of nationalist and populist discourse and 
is more specific in identifying the conspiring minority than in referencing 
the people. In his campaign 2004 speech, for example he praises Slovenian 
nationhood “We fought for it, we grew up in it and we learned in it”. One 
Slovenian scholar described Janša’s discourse as radical populism, close to 
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demagoguery, and Janša as a familiar example of an East European dissident 
– an anticommunist authoritarian (Rizman 2006).   
Borisov in Bulgaria was accused of involvement in various corruption 
scandals, money laundering, attacks on media freedom and connections to 
organized crime, xenophobia and extremism. Previous research identified 
him as a populist who capitalizes on anti-corruption campaign (De Waele and 
Cholova 2011). Based on holistic grading, Borisov’s populism is moderate 
and of a weak populist nature. A Manichean vision is not consistent across 
his speeches but is clearly identifiable where it does exist. In his famous 2013 
speech, he portrays his GERB as an embodiment of the people, emphasizing, 
“We came into power because of the will of the people” and describing himself 
as a common man who “loves to walk with the people”. The conspiring elite 
in Borisov’s speeches is almost always the opposition. In his ribbon-cutting 
2012 speech, he claims, “before we came to power, all of the European funds 
for Bulgaria were blocked because of corruption, and this should be the 
question for Stanishev every time he opens his mouth”. 
Weak populists
Several prime ministers in our analysis who have previously been 
accused of populism turned out to be either weakly or not at all populist. 
This finding especially holds for the Kaczyński brothers in Poland, whose 
populist scores are very low. However, several undemocratic activities 
occurred during their tenure, including changing the constitutional set-up, 
curtailing the independence of the media and civil society, centralizing power 
and exaggerating external dangers (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008). Both 
brothers emphasized the moral deterioration of the Third Republic, which 
was, according to them, associated with corrupt elites. They favored the 
establishment of a post-communist Fourth Republic that would be founded 
on traditional values propagated by the Catholic Church. Jarosław Kaczyński 
adopted an “us versus them” attitude only in his 2007 campaign speech, while 
in his other speeches, although he focused on traditional values, he painted the 
world in generally pluralist terms. In his campaign 2007 speech his opponents 
were described as “bunch of liars”, “oligarchs”, and “multi-millionaires” who 
created “pathological structures and created privileges” that are “against 
the interests of Poles”. Consequently, Third Republic elite members did not 
deserve to be a part of the morally superior Fourth Republic and the true is 
that the de-communization of members of the old communist elite and all the 
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other elite that was against the moral principles of the Polish people become 
a centerpiece of Kaczyński’s tenure (Bugaric 2008, 193).  
Lech Kaczyński’s discourse was similar to that of his brother and he also spoke 
about the moral deterioration of the Polish state that requires the restoration 
of “justice and honesty”. However, he was more specific in referencing ‘the 
people’, which is likely related to his direct presidential mandate. Unlike 
his brother, he was less prone to identifying any specific elite, which was 
likely a strategy to appeal to a broader electorate. Finally, in his campaign 
2005 speech, systemic change favoring an increase in presidential powers to 
allow the fighting of “society’s pathologies” was immediately tempered with 
pluralist ideas about “governing that belongs to the majority in the parliament 
and constitutional change that is dependent on the results of parliamentary 
elections”. Our findings resonate with previous studies. Based on the level of 
state intervention and exclusiveness, Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
scored low on populism (Jasiewicz 2008, 9). In fact, Polish populism can be 
best described as the process of elite replacement by positioning the alternative 
set of political actors as more authentic representatives of the people, rather 
than a comprehensive bottom-up conception of politics (Stanley 2012).
Simeon II, former Bulgarian king and prime minister from 2001 until 2005, 
was previously accused of populism, especially during his 2001 campaign 
(De Waele and Cholova 2011). Our data support this finding. In his 2001 
speech, Simeon II adopted an “us versus them” narrative, presenting himself 
and his National Movement of Stability and Progress (NDSV) as “an agent 
of the people, sympathetic to their agony”. However, his other speeches are 
generally pluralist and only mildly populist. He did propose an overthrow of 
the existing bipolar party model, which could be an element of populism, but 
he also failed to identify any specific enemy. He favored the reconciliation and 
unification of all political forces, which is usually a trait of pluralist discourse. 
Borisov, on the other hand, was more critical of the governing parties and 
presented himself as a “common man”, which explains his higher numerical 
score compared to Simeon II (De Waele and Cholova 2011, 33).
Ivo Sanader in Croatia and Viktor Ponta in Romania were both accused of 
populism; however, according to the holistic grading their discourses are only 
weakly populist and generally pluralist. Sanader occasionally demonized 
the socialist opposition or referenced past enemies (largely from the former 
Yugoslav regime) but was generally pluralist and in favor of cooperating 
with international institutions and respecting international standards. Ponta 
adopted “the people versus the elite” attitude only during his campaign in 
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2012. However, even then, his clash with then incumbent president Basescu15 
appeared more relevant than his commitment to bottom-up politics. He 
accused Basescu and the previous ruling elite lead by Emil Boc of having 
communist roots, being corrupt, unwisely using European infrastructural 
funds and cutting back welfare. In his campaign 2012 speech, he claimed 
[“We cannot go back to their stealing, to their cowardice, to the way in which 
they sold our country piece by piece so that they can stay in power just a bit 
longer” (…) “they must be responsible for all the evil they have done” (…) 
“they must not be brought to Parliament, they must be brought to the Courts 
of Justice”]. At the same time, he portrayed himself and his socialist-liberal 
coalition as “the savior of Romanians, ready to fix past elite injustices”. His 
other speeches were largely pluralist in nature with a clear tendency towards 
unifying political forces and were against further polarization or institutional 
conflicts.
Based on our data, populism among Baltic prime ministers is not popular. Einars 
Repše and Aigars Kalvītis in Latvia adopted a mild populist discourse when 
speaking of opposition parties and former Soviet regime as a conspiring elite, 
but are otherwise largely pluralist. This finding resonates with a comprehensive 
study of populism among Baltic parties that found little evidence of the success 
of populism. According to that study, the small size of political communities 
and individual interactions among elite members make populism an unattractive 
strategy, especially in Latvia and Estonia, while it may be somewhat more 
attractive in Lithuania where larger number of parties compete for power (Balcere 
2014; Jakobson et al. 2012). Somewhat higher populist scores for two Latvian 
prime ministers deserve further investigation. Do personal characteristics make 
some individuals more prone to populism (which could explain the incidence of 
occasional populist individuals in populism’s non- fertile settings)? Answering 
such research questions might benefit from political psychology that should be 
considered in the study of populism.
The advantages and limitations of holistic grading
Holistic grading as a specific type of textual analysis has several advantages 
compared to other methods, but it is not without its limitations. The ability 
15  Ponta and his coalition attempted to impeach Basescu, alleging that he had breached the 
constitution and overstepped his authority. To be considered valid, the impeachment process 
had to be confirmed by referendum, which failed due to low voter turnout and Basescu 
continued as president. 
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to not only identify but also demonstrate variation in the political discourse 
of individual leaders across time and space is an obvious contribution to 
the scientific literature. This permits the researchers of populism to move 
away from typical single case-oriented studies to comparisons between large 
numbers of cases. Data obtained by holistic grading further emphasize that 
only after systematic analysis of populism is carried out can we justifiably 
identify someone as a populist. As our data indicate, the speeches of many 
prime ministers previously accused of populism were graded low on the scale 
of populism, which fits them into only weak populist or pluralist discourse 
categories. Additionally, holistic grading not only relies on numerical scores 
to reveal someone’s populism but also on qualitative data that extend our 
knowledge as to why particular leaders score high or low on a numerical 
scale.   
Findings in this study also suggest that populism defined as a set of ideas 
is context-dependent and triggered by certain environment-related factors. 
For example, Czech Miloš Zeman was accused of populism during his 2013 
presidential campaign yet our data confirmed he was not at all populist during 
his term as prime minister. The same holds for Hungarian Viktor Orbán who 
was moderately populist in his second term as prime minister, while generally 
pluralist during his first prime ministerial term. Further research should find 
ways to include context-dependent variables into the study of populism. 
An additional limitation of the method might be the potential bias on the 
side of coders with regard to how they perceive leaders’ discourses when 
grading speeches after large time lapses. We overcome this potential bias 
by emphasizing to coders during training sessions that a particular political 
speech is always to be evaluated for what it is, instead of what it could be, 
given the political circumstances of each particular context. For example, we 
insisted that Orbán’s earlier speeches were to be judged based only on the 
elements of each discourse present in the text, and not based on how populist 
Orbán may have sounded in a particular speech, taking into account current 
or past political and media presentations. 
Finally, our analysis opens up avenues for solving old and new puzzles 
concerning populism. After learning how populist someone is we can 
investigate the reasons why that matters for politics. Thus, holistic grading 
has an immediate research impact on the study of populism’s causes and 
consequences. Moreover, scientifically-relevant questions that follow from 
our analysis relate to the need to examine populism in settings otherwise not 
obviously fertile for its growth. Finally, the data in this study resonate with 
previous arguments about the relationship between populism and democratic 
violations. All the populist prime ministers in our dataset engaged to an extent 
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in democratically dubious practices. However, the data in our study reveal 
that undemocratic experiments were not absent during non-populist prime 
ministerial terms. This suggests that we need to learn more about how exactly 
populism affects politics and if other intervening factors contribute to the 
relationship. Further research would benefit by focusing on the correlations 
between populist discourse and democratic violations. A political culture 
generally not conducive to democracy (rather than populism alone) might 
explain the occasionally undemocratic lapses of some political individuals. 
However, the consequences for democratic politics appear to be in most 
danger when undemocratic and populist mindsets coincide.  
CONCLUSION
The study described in this paper involved the holistic grading as a specific 
technique of textual analysis of political speeches by CEE prime ministers. 
The result is a large dataset of political discourse among 27 contemporary 
prime ministers in eleven CEE countries during 30 prime ministerial terms. 
Populism is defined here as a set of ideas that include the holding of a 
Manichean worldview in which the people are juxtaposed against corrupt 
elites in a constant struggle for power. Consequently, populists advocate the 
overthrow of unjust elites and frequently resort to bellicose language when 
addressing political opponents. To distinguish between different political 
discourses besides populism we also considered pluralism, which rejects 
the Manichean worldview, reveres political differences, respects democratic 
standards and political opponents. 
The ideational definition of populism guided the holistic grading of political 
speeches by each prime minister in order to express political discourse on a 
three-point numerical scale to denote strong or moderate populist or pluralist 
discourse. Systematic analysis of the political discourse of CEE prime 
ministers confirmed the existence of strong populist discourse in only one, and 
moderate populist discourse in five out of 27 CEE prime ministers. We also 
note the existence of stronger populist discourse during electoral campaigns, 
compared to actual prime ministerial tenures. This could be explained by 
prime ministers’ tendency to abandon the pursuit of anti-elite rhetoric once 
they become part of the official elite. Our data support previous findings 
obtained by holistic grading (Hawkins 2009). The incidence, intensity and the 
distribution of populist discourse across different speech categories by CEE 
prime ministers compared to Latin American presidents are almost identical. 
All this leads to the conclusion that academic and media concerns about the 
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prevalence of populist zeitgeist are slightly overrated. 
Holistic grading is an efficient and reliable measurement technique for 
cross-regional comparisons of leaders’ political discourse compared to other 
manually-coded methods of content analysis. The main contribution of the 
method is its ability to move the study of populism away from typically single 
case-oriented research to the comparison of large numbers of cases across 
time and space. Holistic grading facilitates the systematic study of populism 
and not only identifies but also signifies the intensity of populist discourse 
using a numerical scale. In addition, the qualitative data obtained by the 
method support the awarding of numerical scores, making it clearer why one 
particular discourse fits one or another category. The method’s application 
is not limited to political speeches, but has potential for use in appraising 
other official (i.e. party manifestos) or unofficial (i.e. Facebook or Twitter) 
political texts. In addition, by testing the method on other types of political 
texts, future research could analyze how various context-related factors drive 
political discourse. 
The systematic analysis of populist discourse using holistic grading has 
immediate implications for the study of populism’s causes and consequences. 
Hitherto, research has speculated about the consequences populism has 
on politics, emphasizing its negative effect on democratic structures. The 
findings of this study confirm that such a relationship does exist. All the 
populist prime ministers resorted to some undemocratic practices during their 
terms. However, occasional democratic violations were also common among 
non-populist (or less populist) prime ministers. This suggests that more 
research is required to improve our knowledge about exactly how someone’s 
populist discourse relates to democratic structure. The existence of a political 
culture generally not conducive to democracy rather than populism alone 
might explain the democratic violations of political individuals who engage 
in less intense populist discourse. Nevertheless, democratic structures are 
least secure when undemocratic and populist mindsets coincide.    
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